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Introduction
The U.S. Government is devoting unprecedented attention to 
the health care sector. Among the different initiatives is the 
policy of increasing the openness of information by providing 
the public with better access to federal data sets. Achieving 
data and information dissemination without harming anyone 
is a central task of any entity in charge of collecting data. 
The balance lies in protecting the privacy of those in the data 
while minimizing data utility loss (Kinney, Karr, & Gonzalez, 
2009). Although the need for such balance is true of every 
data set, it becomes more critical when the information col-
lected is about personal health status and personal health 
care received.
The benefits of data dissemination are potentially enor-
mous. Rigorous research providing information about the 
quality, efficiency, effectiveness, and safety of the health 
care received by members of society can inform and guide 
decisions in all public policy debates. At the same time, data 
privacy and confidentiality violations could be potentially 
disastrous for individuals or groups (Rothstein, 2010). Such 
a breach, in turn, could cause irreparable damage to the cred-
ibility of the data collector and disseminator.
In this article, we examine the literature on data and 
statistical confidentiality. Rather than comparing the theo-
retical properties of specific methods, we emphasize the main 
themes that emerge from the ongoing discussion among 
scientists regarding how best to achieve the appropriate bal-
ance between data protection and data dissemination. With 
that objective, we examine the literature published in aca-
demic journals and books and proceedings from specialized 
conferences. The fields in which much of the discussion is 
concentrated include statistics, computer science, data pri-
vacy and security, electrical engineering, bioinformatics, and 
health services.
This article provides a summary of key concepts and issues 
in the literature. It is designed to be a point of entry for policy 
makers, researchers, and practitioners in the health care sector 
who are new to the literature and for those considering mak-
ing data sets publicly available. The article discusses only the 
literature on statistical disclosure methods. It does not discuss 
computational disclosure control (i.e., computer programs that 
maintain anonymity by automatically generalizing, substitut-
ing, and removing information when users access the data), 
methods for tabular data, attribute disclosure (i.e., disclosure 
of sensitive information other than direct identifiers), or 
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inferential disclosure (i.e., information that can be inferred 
about a record in a data set with better accuracy). There is 
significant literature on each of these topics, which are 
beyond the scope of this article.
Our article is divided into six sections, of which this 
“Introduction” is the first. The second section presents 
“The Policy and Academic Context” surrounding the dis-
cussion. The third section discusses the state of the art in 
“De-Identification Methods,” while the fourth emphasizes 
the state of the art in “Reidentification Methods.” The fifth 
section presents the conclusions from the literature on the 
different ways in which users may “Access” public data, 
stressing the trade-offs between (a) confidentiality and util-
ity and (b) confidentiality and ease of access. The last sec-
tion presents the “Conclusion.”
The Policy and Academic Context
Historic Perspective
Concerns about privacy and confidentiality in governmental 
efforts to collect and disseminate information are not new. 
As a review by Anderson and Seltzer (2009) suggests, “the 
roots of the modern concept of federal statistical confiden-
tiality can be traced directly back to the late nineteenth 
century” (p. 8). Notwithstanding this history, the literature 
on statistical disclosure methods is fairly recent by mod-
ern standards (Dalenius, 1977, is considered the seminal 
paper). In 1975, the U.S. Federal Committee on Statistical 
Methodology (FCSM) was organized by the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) to investigate issues of 
data quality affecting federal statistics. As part of this effort, 
the Subcommittee on Disclosure Limitation Methodology, 
created within the FCSM, published its 1994 Statistical 
Policy Working Paper 22 (SPWP22). This paper, which 
was revised in 2005 by the Confidentiality and Data Access 
Committee (CDAC, 2005), sets good practice guidelines and 
recommendations for all agencies regarding confidentiality 
protection.
Defining Confidentiality and Disclosure
A definition of confidentiality is given in SPWP22. According 
to the document, the definition endorsed by the President’s 
Commission on Federal Statistics states that “[Confidential 
should mean that the dissemination] of data in a manner that 
would allow public identification of the respondent or would 
in any way be harmful to him is prohibited, and that the data 
are immune from legal process.” This definition originates 
from the book Private Lives and Public Policies by Duncan, 
Jabine, and de Wolf (1993). Similarly, and according to the 
same source, “confidentiality differs from privacy” because 
“it applies to business as well as individuals. Privacy is an 
individual right whereas confidentiality often applies to data 
on organizations and firms.”
Several different definitions of disclosure risk have been 
proposed. SPWP22 follows Duncan et al. (1993): “Disclosure 
relates to inappropriate attribution of information to a data 
subject, whether an individual or an organization.” The same 
authors distinguish three types of disclosure: (a) when a data 
subject is identified from a released file (identity disclosure), 
(b) when sensitive information about a data subject is revealed 
through the released file (attribute disclosure), or (c) when the 
released data make it possible to determine the value of some 
characteristic of an individual more accurately than otherwise 
would have been possible (inferential disclosure).
Need for Protection, Need for Information
The biggest policy tension underlying the debate in the literature 
is the need to balance two inherently competing goals: need 
for information and need for protection. Federal agencies are 
required by law to protect the confidentiality of individual 
information. For instance, Title 13 of the U.S. Code prevents 
the census from releasing data in which any particular indi-
vidual or establishment can be identified. Other legislation 
aimed at preventing such disclosures includes the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and the 
Confidential Information Protection and Statistical Efficiency 
Act (CIPSEA). At the same time, the government is committed 
to providing data to the research community for the advance-
ment of knowledge (e.g., Open Government Directive).
On one hand, access to microdata (i.e., data collected on 
individuals or households) generates “more and better research, 
higher transparency, better assessment of data quality, bet-
ter assessment of data gaps, and replicability” (Lane, 2007). 
Advocates of greater access to health care data justify their 
position based on the public’s need for information about 
“quality, efficiency, effectiveness, and safety of the health 
care they receive and pay for” (Rosenbaum, 2010). On the 
other hand, scholars highlight the need to “protect patient 
privacy, the confidential nature of the patient/professional 
relationship, and health information security” (Rosenbaum, 
2010). Data breaches also represent legal and financial liabili-
ties for data custodians and erode public trust in their ability to 
handle data (Couper, Singer, Conrad, & Groves, 2008; Couper, 
Singer, Conrad, & Groves, 2010).
The disclosure literature is divided into two competing 
research paradigms: (a) that it is possible to protect and release 
data and (b) that privacy and confidentiality cannot be achieved 
in an environment in which personal information is gathered at an 
increasing rate by multiple people with multiple interests. The lit-
erature on disclosure limitation techniques and their achieve-
ments is extensive. In 1998, for example, the Journal of Official 
Statistics devoted an entire issue to this question. In addition, 
every 2 years the UNESCO sponsors an international conference 
(i.e., Privacy in Statistical Databases) that gathers worldwide 
experts from different disciplines to discuss current issues 
in the field. Proceedings are published by Springer in the 
series Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Domingo-Ferrer, 
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2002; Domingo-Ferrer & Franconi, 2006; Domingo-Ferrer & 
Magkos, 2010; Domingo-Ferrer & Saygin, 2008; Domingo-
Ferrer & Torra, 2004; European Communities, 1998).
More recently, the book by Duncan, Elliot, and Salazar-
González (2011) provides a comprehensive understanding of 
the principles and practice of statistical confidentiality. Other 
recent technical reviews are those by B. Chen, Kifer, LeFevre, 
and Machanavajjhala (2009) and Fung, Wang, Chen, and Yu 
(2010) on the latest developments in the field of Privacy-
preserving data publishing, and by Fayyoumi and Oommen 
(2010) on statistical disclosure control and microaggregation 
techniques for secure statistical databases.
The belief behind the statistical literature is that it is, indeed, 
possible to minimize the risk of disclosure and, therefore, 
to release data to the public. This belief is, however, not 
shared by other scientists. For instance, computer scientists 
Narayanan and Shmatikov (2010) criticize such an approach 
by suggesting that the underlying assumption behind 
de-identification techniques is that personally identifiable 
information is a fixed set of attributes such as names and 
contact information. This, according to the same research-
ers, “creates the fallacious distinction between ‘identifying’ 
and ‘non-identifying’ attributes.” In particular, these authors 
clarify that such a distinction might make sense in the context 
of one attack but is increasingly meaningless as the amount 
and variety of publicly available information about individu-
als grow exponentially (Narayanan & Shmatikov, 2010).
In a similar vein, computer scientists Cynthia Dwork and 
Moni Naor show that the type of privacy defined by Dalenius 
in 1977 (“access to a statistical database should not enable 
one to learn anything about an individual that could not 
be learned without access”) cannot be achieved in general. 
The obstacle, according to these authors, “is in the auxiliary 
information.” The main result in their paper is that “in any 
‘reasonable’ setting there is a piece of information that is in 
itself innocent, yet in conjunction with even a modified 
(noisy) version of the data yields a privacy breach” (Dwork 
& Naor, 2010, p. 93). To sidestep this issue, Dwork (2006) 
defines differential privacy and shows that this type of pri-
vacy can be implemented and formally proven.
As pointed out by one of our reviewers, while both 
approaches (favored by statisticians or by computer scien-
tists) balance utility and disclosure risk, differential privacy 
is limited in practice. It can only be used in settings where 
access to the data is remote and controlled. This removes 
traditional public use files (PUFs) or any microdata delivery 
from its scope. Consistent with our objective of providing a 
useful literature review for practitioners interested in making 
data sets publicly available, we concentrate our literature 
review on statistical disclosure methods.
Privacy Compromises
Privacy compromises in published data have been documented 
by Sweeny (1997), Agrawal and Srikant (2000), Algranati and 
Kadane (2004), and Ochoa et al. (2008). Recently, in a widely 
cited paper, Narayanan and Shmatikov (2008) show the feasi-
bility of large-scale reidentification using movie-viewing his-
tories. These authors suggest that statistical de-identification 
techniques provide only a weak form of privacy (Narayanan 
& Shmatikov, 2010) and that privacy protection has to be 
built and reasoned about on a case-by-case basis (Narayanan 
& Shmatikov, 2010).
Last, other scholars suggest that while attempts to reiden-
tify individuals are partly mitigated through legal barriers, 
such as data user agreements or confidentiality agreements 
that explicitly ban users from doing it, “such policies provide 
no formal privacy protection guarantees” (Loukides, Denny, 
& Malin, 2010).
Consequences of Misapplication  
of Disclosure Avoidance Procedures
Although Winkler (2007), using artificial data, warned of 
“the severe analytic distortions of many widely used mask-
ing methods that have been in use for a number of years,” 
not until recently have researchers documented problems 
with data released in PUFs.
In particular, Alexander, Davern, and Stevenson (2010) 
discover and document errors in public use microdata sam-
ples (“PUMS files”) of the 2000 census, the 2003-2006 
American Community Survey (ACS), and the 2004-2009 
Current Population Survey, due to the misapplication of dis-
closure avoidance procedures. The particular procedure that 
caused the problem is not cited in the paper, nor disclosed in 
ACS’s errata notes #47 or #50.
These authors show that for women and men ages 65 and 
older, age- and sex-specific population estimates generated 
from the PUMS files differ by as much as 15% from counts in 
published data tables. Additional analysis of labor force par-
ticipation and marriage rates in the same publication shows 
that PUMS samples are not representative of the population 
at individual ages for those ages 65 and older, and that PUMS 
files substantially (a) underestimate labor force participation 
for those near retirement age and (b) overestimate it for those 
at older ages.
Finally, these authors emphasize that the problem could affect 
a whole range of stakeholders: researchers, social service agencies 
that rely on the data for policy research, and survey researchers 
who use PUMS data to generate population estimates.
De-identification Methods
The first step to prevent disclosure is to remove all direct iden-
tifying variables, such as name, phone number, and address. 
This step is intuitive, and one could naively think the data set 
is then safe from disclosure because no individual is explicitly 
identifiable. However, as cited earlier (Agrawal & Srikant, 
2000; Sweeney, 1997) removal of direct identifiers does not 
protect all individuals from data disclosure or reidentifica-
tion. A combination of just a few indirect identifying vari-
ables (such as birth date, gender, and zip code) can be used 
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to identify a large portion of individuals on any data set. 
These variables could then be matched to publicly available 
data to identify records. Disclosure risk represents the risk of 
indirect identifiers (IVs) being used to match records to an 
external data source that contains direct identifiers. The chal-
lenge of any de-identification technique is to limit reidentifi-
cation via the use of indirect identifying variables.
This section describes the methods used to de-identify a 
data set. First, we define disclosure and disclosure risk and 
discuss the goals of disclosure treatment. We then describe 
the methods for de-identification of microdata and the use 
of nonsynthetic and synthetic treatments. Finally, we dis-
cuss the issues related to de-identification of longitudinal 
microdata.
Disclosure and Disclosure Risk Defined
Disclosure is the communication, either directly or by infer-
ence, of information about a member of a data set that could 
not be known without viewing the data set. We call this 
information “sensitive information” going forward. It is the 
obligation of the owner of the data set or data provider to 
prevent disclosure of sensitive information about members 
of the data set.
An intruder is someone who wants to discover sensitive 
information about any person (or other entity) from the data 
set. In short, disclosure is the process of an intruder discover-
ing sensitive information about a target they did not know 
prior to intrusion.
Disclosure risk is a measure of the probability of disclo-
sure for either an individual record or a data set as a whole. 
Skinner (2009) gives two useful definitions: (a) Disclosure 
risk is concerned with the possibility that the intruder will be 
able to determine a correct link between a microdata record 
and a known unit and (b) disclosure risk might be defined as 
the probability of disclosure with respect to specified sources 
of uncertainty, such as whether the disclosed information is 
accurately attributed to a target.
These definitions show that, for any data set, the calcula-
tion of disclosure risk relies heavily on assumptions about the 
intruder’s knowledge. The more knowledge an intruder has 
about a potential target in a data set, the higher the probability 
that the intruder will be able to correctly identify the target 
and disclose information.
What Are the Goals of Disclosure Treatment?
Dalenius (1977) states that “access to a statistical database 
should not enable one to learn anything about an individual 
that could not be learned without access.” While this is a 
noble goal, Dwork (2006) states that this level of privacy, 
zero disclosure risk, cannot be achieved for microdata or 
even published macrodata. Given that disclosure risk cannot 
be zero for analytically useful data sets, the goal should be 
to make the risk as low as possible. For instance, Skinner 
(2009) says that “confidentiality of the answers provided by 
a respondent might be said to be protected if the disclosure 
risk for this respondent and the respondent’s answers is suf-
ficiently low.” Previous research (Dalenius, 1988; Fienberg 
& McIntyre, 2005) argues that data should be released if the 
probability of identifying an individual or entity in the data 
file is appropriately small. The emerging consensus of the 
field is that if the disclosure risk is small then data should be 
released; however, current research has not been specific 
about a defined risk measure, assumptions about the intruder, 
or what constitutes “small.”
Winkler (1997) takes a different stance, stating, “in pro-
ducing confidential public-use data files, statistical agencies 
should first assure that the files are analytically valid.” That is 
not to say that data confidentiality is unimportant; it just calls 
out that producing a data set with low disclosure risk but little 
analytic utility is akin to not producing a data set at all because 
its release has no analytic benefit.
Therefore, the goal of the data producer should be to pro-
duce an analytically useful data file, with acceptably small 
disclosure risk for the individuals in the file. Currently, the 
definition of what is “acceptably small” is up to the provider, 
based on the provider’s obligation to the participants in the 
data set. If risk cannot be made adequately small while pre-
serving data utility, the provider should consider alternative 
methods of publishing or limiting access to the data. A com-
bination of de-identification, access control, and data use 
agreements may be a more appropriate solution (Abowd & 
Lane, 2004; Lane & Schur, 2010).
The following sections are discussed in the context of 
treating a microdata file, but many of the same techniques 
can also be applied to tabular data (Skinner, 2009).
Nonsynthetic Treatments of Microdata
As opposed to synthetic disclosure treatments, where all 
records in a data set are treated, nonsynthetic methods treat 
only a fraction of the records in the data set. This is usually 
done deterministically to reduce the disclosure risk of a 
small group of (or single) records. Nonsynthetic disclosure 
treatments consist of three primary tools: global recoding, 
suppression, and perturbation. Nonsynthetic disclosure treat-
ments are designed to specifically treat records with high 
disclosure risk to produce a data set that has a low risk of 
disclosure. However, the deterministic nature of the treat-
ment can introduce selection bias that can degrade analytic 
utility (Singh, 2009).
Global Recoding and  
Local Suppression (GRLS)
Global recoding is a process of reducing the number of 
values a single variable can have in a data set. For example, 
an individual’s birth date may exist in a data set and could 
be used as an indirect identifying variable. However, the 
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variable could be recoded to birth year and be less useful as 
an IV; it could be further recoded to 5-year intervals to make 
it even less identifying. Decisions on the appropriate level of 
recoding are based on the trade-off made between the com-
peting needs for data confidentiality and preservation of data 
utility.
Local suppression is the process of removing, or sup-
pressing, data from a data set. This can be done for single 
variables within a record or an entire record. Level of sup-
pression is again determined by the de-identification strategy 
being used and the competing needs for data confidentiality 
versus data utility.
Sweeney (2002) defines k-anonymity as follows: “A 
release provides k-anonymity protection if the information 
for each person contained in the release cannot be distin-
guished from k-1 individuals whose information also appears 
in the release.” The concept of k-anonymity is the same as 
“cell size,” which was already in use by professional statisti-
cians interested in limiting disclosure of information in pub-
lic data sets. Willenborg and de Waal (1996) provide a 
historical perspective on this broadly used concept. Sweeney 
achieves k-anonymity in a data set through the use of global 
recoding. Indirect identifying variables are recoded until 
each combination of recoded variables has at least k number 
of records associated with it. At this point, no individual in 
the data set can be identified with certainty because no indi-
vidual has a unique IV profile.
There are algorithms whose purpose is to make the pro-
cess of recoding as efficient as possible by minimizing the 
amount of information loss while reducing disclosure risk. 
El Emam et al. (2009) discuss some of these information loss 
metrics in detail. Note that they are only useful in making 
decisions regarding recoding and suppression; they do not 
give the user/analyst any measure of data utility.
The concept of k-anonymity drives several real world 
systems, including Datafly, k-Similar (Sweeney, 2002); 
Samarati, Incognito, and Optimal Lattice Anonymization 
(OLA; El Emam et al, 2009); and µ-argus (Hundepool et al., 
2008). Most of these packages use local suppression in addi-
tion to global recoding to create a k-anonymous data set.
Perturbation
Perturbation, another process that can be used to reduce 
disclosure risk, alters the values of variables on the data set. 
This could be performed to make reidentification more dif-
ficult on (a) variables expected to be known to the intruder 
(IVs) or (b) particularly sensitive information not known to 
the intruder (sensitive variables or SVs). Nonsynthetic per-
turbation treats only a portion of the records on the data set. 
Synthetic perturbation treats all records in the data set.
Nonsynthetic perturbation can be random or selective. 
Selective perturbation deterministically selects records for 
treatment to reduce disclosure risk. Also called blank and 
impute, this method selects values from single records, 
removes them from the record, then imputes a new value. 
This means that certain values may be targeted more fre-
quently, creating a bias that is difficult for the analyst to 
quantify when interpreting the data (Skinner, 2009).
Data swapping was one of the first perturbation methods, 
proposed by Dalenius and Reiss as early as 1982. It was 
proposed as a method to transform a data set by exchanging 
values of SVs in such a way as to preserve their confidenti-
ality while maintaining data utility. Records were selected 
for a “data swap” of a single SV if the swap resulted in a 
decrease in disclosure risk and preservation of marginal 
counts associated with that SV. This method was shown to 
reduce disclosure risk while protecting data utility for con-
tingency tables and log-linear models; however, data utility 
was found not to be preserved for other types of analysis 
(Fienberg & McIntyre, 2005).
Substitution is similar to data swapping in that data from 
one record are replacing data on another record. As proposed 
by Singh (2009), substitution is the process of replacing some 
or all IVs in a record with the IVs from another record. It is 
different from data swapping in that the data only move in 
one direction. The pairing of records for this substitution pro-
cess relies on techniques common in survey sampling for the 
imputation of missing values. Substitution reduces disclo-
sure risk by creating uncertainty about the association between 
the IVs and SVs for a given record. Records can be selected 
for substitution deterministically to reduce risk, although in 
Singh, they are selected randomly.
GenMASSC: Global Recoding + Random 
Perturbation + Random Suppression + 
Calibration
Singh (2009) and Singh, Yu, and Dunteman (2003) propose 
the combination of multiple elements from synthetic and 
nonsynthetic frameworks to de-identify data while simulta-
neously controlling disclosure risk and information loss. The 
first treatment step is global recoding, the amount of which 
is driven by reducing disclosure risk within constraints that 
preserve data utility. The second step is random perturbation 
by substitution. Records are randomly selected to have their 
indirect identifying variables replaced with variables from a 
different record on the data set with similar properties. The 
third operation is the random suppression of entire records 
from the data set. The rates of selection for substitution and 
suppression can be functions of the disclosure risk of the 
record, so that records at higher risk may be chosen for treat-
ment at a higher rate. After all treatment is complete, the 
data set is calibrated so that predetermined analytic values 
are representative of the data set prior to treatment. The sto-
chastic nature of this treatment limits the amount of bias in 
the treated data set and allows the data provider to monitor 
and control the amount of bias and variance in the treated 
data for a given level of disclosure risk.
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Synthetic Treatments of Microdata
Synthetic treatments treat all records in the data set to create a 
new, “synthetic” data set that is representative of the original 
data file. This is usually done by treating all the indirect iden-
tifying variables (such as birth date, gender, and zip code) for 
each record in the data set. The indirect identifying variables 
may be changed by a variety of methods, including perturba-
tion, multiple imputation, and other model-based techniques 
(Skinner, 2009). Such methods are tuned to preserve data 
utility, at least for anticipated analyses, and data confidenti-
ality is assumed to be improved because none of the records 
in the microdata represents an actual individual.
In stochastic perturbation, indirect identifying variables 
are modified by a random mechanism. Continuous variables 
are altered by adding random noise. The noise may be added 
so that the mean and variance of the variables within certain 
domains will be preserved. However, correlations outside the 
specifications (i.e., variables selected for synthetic treatment) 
at the time of the noise addition will not be preserved (Skinner, 
2009). For instance, consider the case when a data producer 
applied synthetic treatment aimed at preserving the relation-
ship between income and gender but decided to leave race 
outside the specification. If a user were to analyze the rela-
tionship between race and income, the data might be distorted 
because the treatment was not trying to preserve that particu-
lar relationship (i.e., race and income). In general, it may not 
be practical, or possible, for all relationships to be preserved 
during treatment. The data producer may have to make some 
tough decisions about which relationships are most important 
and, thus, to be preserved during treatment.
Fuller (1993) discusses methods that can be used to 
improve the analytic utility regarding these “unspecified” 
variables. These methods require the data provider to let the 
analyst know the standard deviation of the noise that was 
added to the indirect identifying variables. The analyst must 
then add procedures that use this information to the analysis 
for the output to gain the same inferences as the untreated 
data. A potential difficulty with this approach is that some 
reidentification experts suggest that knowing information 
about how the noise was applied to the variables can allow 
an intruder to reverse “engineer” the data file and poten-
tially identify individuals. Details on how noise can be 
reverse engineered are available in Domingo-Ferrer, Sebe, 
and Castella-Roca (2004).
Other forms of synthetic perturbation include data swap-
ping or substitution for all records in the data set. This is an 
extension of the previously mentioned nonsynthetic perturba-
tion methods, where selection for treatment is expanded from 
deterministic or random selection processes to 100% selec-
tion as part of a synthetic treatment.
Categorical variables can be reclassified using a modeling 
mechanism such as the postrandomization method (PRAM; 
Gouweleeuw, Kooiman, Willenborg, & De Wolf, 1998). These 
methods use other variables in the data set to find probabilities 
for levels of the categorical indirect identifying variable that 
is to be treated. The model is then scored for all records and 
the initial value of the variable replaced with the new variable. 
Depending on the structure of the model used, the treated data 
set can be analyzed as is, or may require additional informa-
tion from the data provider to the researcher to perform valid 
analysis. As with noise addition, the application of this extra 
information requires increased computations by the analyst 
to produce valid results.
Multiple imputation uses a model to create synthetic 
records based on a known distribution of indirect identifying 
variables for the data set. More records are created through 
these processes than are intended for release. The population 
of synthetic records is then sampled multiple times to esti-
mate the analytic properties of the data set, with one of the 
samples released as the treated data set. The analyst can treat 
this data set as a survey sample with known variances and 
use standard survey sample techniques of analysis. A detailed 
review of this process can be seen in Rubin (1993). Abowd, 
Stinson, and Benedetto (2006) present an implementation 
of this technique using linked data from the census, Social 
Security Administration, Internal Revenue Service, and 
Congressional Budget Office. Multiple imputation removes 
the need for the provider to pass information regarding per-
turbation to the analyst, which also frees the analyst from 
extra calculations required when analyzing data.
Synthetic data approaches can also be applied to a subset of 
the data (Little & Liu, 2003; Reiter, 2009). For instance, an 
agency could be interested in replacing income when it exceeds 
a certain threshold but is willing to release all other values 
(Reiter, 2009). The result is a partially synthetic data set.
As mentioned, the advantage of synthetic data is that they 
are designed to preserve data utility. The data confidentiality 
of the process is assumed to be implied because no “real” 
records are released. Domingo-Ferrer & Torra (2003) shows 
that this is not necessarily the case, however, and that there 
are reidentification techniques capable of disclosing infor-
mation about individuals in a synthetic data set that has been 
de-identified using synthetic treatments. Other limitations of 
synthetic microdata are (a) the expertise and effort required 
to build a model and (b) that the quality of the treated data 
and its analysis is a direct result of the quality of the model 
(Singh, 2009; Winkler, 2007).
De-identification of Longitudinal Microdata
The de-identification of longitudinal data has not been explored 
by many researchers, as it has been thought an unobtainable 
goal. Several researchers note that preserving the data confi-
dentiality and data utility of a public use longitudinal data set 
may be inherently incompatible goals (Abowd & Woodcock, 
2002; Nadeau, Gagnon, & Latouche, 1999). However, Abowd 
and colleagues have successfully used multiple imputation 
synthetic de-identification techniques to treat longitudinal 
data (Abowd et al., 2006; Abowd & Woodcock, 2002). It is 
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important to note that these techniques summarize the longi-
tudinal data prior to treatment and data are still de-identified 
by individual, not by longitudinal event or record. In addi-
tion, data present on the longitudinal file that were not sum-
marized prior to treatment are not available to the analyst, as 
there is no direct publication of the longitudinal data.
Assessing Data Utility After Treatment
Data anonymity and analytic utility are in constant tension, 
with increases in one resulting in a decrease in the other. 
However, assessment of data utility is a vital step following 
de-identification treatment and should go in concert with dis-
closure risk analysis. Researchers have developed a variety of 
methods by which to automate the analysis of data utility 
using specially designed software. Together with the assess-
ment of risk, it has also been shown that certain methods of 
de-identification are less effective than others at maintaining 
data utility and protecting personal privacy (Winkler, 2007). 
Kennickell and Lane (2007) give a good overview of the role 
of data utility in the context of de-identification treatment and 
several methods that appear throughout the literature.
One such method of comparison is between simulated 
research results on treated and untreated data sets. In their 
analysis of disclosure risk and analytic utility, Brickell and 
Shmatikov (2008) show it is necessary to render a data min-
ing utility near useless to researchers when using generaliza-
tion and suppression of quasi-identifiers to de-identify a data 
set. These researchers compared their results with what 
was called “trivial sanitization” of the data set, which simply 
omits either all quasi-identifiers or all sensitive attributes to 
provide maximum privacy.
Rastogi, Suciu, and Hong (2007) depict a framework 
for describing privacy and utility of a de-identified data set. 
Privacy is defined as a comparison of an attacker’s probabil-
ity of an ordered list of elements against the probability based 
on experimental observation. To illustrate data privacy and 
utility, these researchers use census data to evaluate a selec-
tion of queries with up to three attributes and estimates of the 
error bound on counting queries. They describe a simple ano-
nymization algorithm that uses random insertions and dele-
tions of varying series of data in, or from, the database.
Other methods compare estimates taken from treated and 
untreated data sets. Winkler (2007); Raghunathan, Reiter, and 
Rubin (2003); and Abowd et al. (2006) all use comparisons of 
correlation and regression coefficients to assess the analytic 
utility of data sets treated to reduce disclosure risk. These 
methods assume the data provider can anticipate many of 
the correlations that will be useful to the user and measure the 
impact of treatment on these relationships prior to release.
Singh (2009) assesses data utility of a treated data set by 
comparing the means of several variables of interest across 
multiple replications of treatment. By using multiple treated 
data sets, a relative (to the mean of the untreated data) root 
mean squared error (RRMSE) can be computed to describe 
how much the value in a treated data set can be expected to 
vary from the value in the untreated data. This measure of 
data utility is on the same scale for all variables of interest 
because it represents the error of the treated values relative to 
the untreated values. The maximum RRMSE represents the 
error of the least reliable variable, or relation of interest, and 
can be used as a simple measure of data utility. This method 
also assumes that the data provider has a good idea of the 
relationships that will be important to the user to measure 
data utility in the proper context.
Reidentification Methods
With the collection and provision of data comes the risk of 
identifying individuals within data sets and the associated 
harms that can run the gamut from inconsequential to cata-
strophic. Several methods have been developed to assess the 
risk of this reidentification and test data sets for the ability 
to identify specific people. The literature reveals four areas 
by which reidentification practice occurs: linking records 
across multiple data sets, linking data across multiple data 
sets, matching patterns within multiple data sets, and, most 
recently, identifying individuals in the public space from 
usage patterns (Winkler, 2004a, 2004b).
The methods presented in the following sections all seek 
to identify individuals when one or more data availability 
scenarios are present (Domingo-Ferrer & Torra, 2003):
• Where there are common variables and a common 
terminology in multiple data sets and these are lev-
eraged to effect reidentification of individuals;
• Where there may be common variables but differ-
ing terminology between data sets;
• Where there are no variables in common between 
comparable data sets but an existing and common 
terminology exists; and
• Where, in the final and most challenging scenario, 
variables and terminology are different between 
data sets.
In each, the method used makes at least the assumption 
that there are individuals in common within the associated 
data sets.
Assessing Risk
Generally, disclosure risk for a target increases as more is 
known, in terms of quantity and precision of data. One of the 
most common methods to measure disclosure risk is to count 
the number of unique records within a data set with a limited 
set of individual record characteristics (El Emam et al., 2010). 
Research has also focused on estimating the number of 
uniques within a population from a sample of data given dif-
ferent possible population distributions (Bethlehem, Keller, & 
Pannekoek, 1990; G. Chen & Keller-McNulty, 1998).
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The challenge in developing different methodologies to 
assess risk is the need to accurately reflect risk. Too conserva-
tive risk assessment needlessly sacrifices data utility in favor 
of individual anonymity; risk assessment that errs on the other 
side risks disclosure of sensitive information. This has been 
described as the over- and under fitting of risk estimates and is 
the main thrust of research in risk disclosure and development 
of the two-way interaction model (Skinner, 2007).
Skinner and Shlomo (2008) further refine the two-way 
interaction model for estimating disclosure risk measures 
through development and use of diagnostic criteria for model 
choice with the goal of balancing over- and under fitting. 
These researchers illustrate the ability to use Poisson log-
linear models in the assessment of risk in large and sparse 
contingency tables spanned by key variables. Their approach 
has been shown to be useful for file-level and record-level 
measures of risk.
Truta, Fotouhi, and Barth-Jones (2004) introduce a gen-
eral framework for assessing disclosure risk by classifying 
data set attributes based on either potential identification util-
ity or order with regard to domain of value. These values, 
termed change factors, measure the magnitude of masking 
applied to data and the modification that has occurred to key 
attributes. Using simulated medical billing data with identifier 
attributes removed, the researchers are able to show minimum, 
maximum, and weighted disclosure risk values for a number 
of different masking methods. They perform a series of exper-
iments whereby random noise is added to identifying attri-
butes (age, sex, ZIP code, and billed amount) and the effect 
on disclosure risk measured. The method described by these 
researchers allows for a measure to assess the amount of 
information loss as a result of the specific masking method 
used; it also presents a way to measure and set the level of 
masking desired to achieve a preset level of risk.
Benitez and Malin (2010) illustrate the wide gap between 
perceived threats of reidentification and actual results. The 
paper tests voter registration data as a route of potential 
reidentification of publicly released health records protected 
by the Safe Harbor policy. In particular, the authors sug-
gest that allusion to the potential uses of voter lists in the lit-
erature (Sweeney, 1997) rarely acknowledges the complexity 
of the data (i.e., access and quality) or the economic costs to 
an attacker.
Their risk analysis estimation in Benitez and Malin (2010) 
is probabilistic in nature, as it quantifies the likelihood of 
reidentification for each member of a group. The analysis con-
sists of a three-step process: (a) determine the fields available 
to an attacker (i.e., year of birth, race, and gender in health 
records and date of birth, year of birth, race, gender, and 
county of residence in voter registration); (b) group census 
data according to these fields to estimate population counts; 
and (c) add results obtained by applying risk estimation met-
rics to the results, and normalize by total population.
Benitez and Malin (2010) find that risk levels and costs 
vary widely across different states due to individual voter 
registration policies, for example, with more permissive states 
having higher risks of disclosure.
Individual risk methodology, developed by Benedetti and 
Franconi (1998), involves the computation of individual risk 
for each unit of analysis within a data set as the probabil-
ity of correct reidentification. The risk of reidentification 
is expressed through the concept of unique or rare combina-
tions in the data, and the methodology uses sampling weights 
to account for the uncertainty of whether such unique combi-
nations are common or rare in the population. All records 
with individual risk above a fixed threshold are defined as 
being at risk, implying that disclosure control methods must 
be used to protect these records.
Elliot (2000) defines an additional measure of disclo-
sure risk that measures correct matches between actual and 
masked data sets. Termed Data Intrusion Simulation (DIS), 
the researcher describes a method that uses the target data set 
to estimate matches given a unique match. The method for-
goes the use of an entire population and instead uses a sam-
ple. The method contains five steps:
1. Take a sample microdata file with sampling fraction.
2. Remove a small random number of records to 
make a new file.
3. Copy back a random number of the records.
4. Match a simulated fragment of the identifica-
tion file with the target microdata file. Generate 
the probability of a correct match given a unique 
match for the fragment.
5. Iterate until the estimate stabilizes.
The effect is to generate a risk of disclosure for a given 
data set without assuming that a given unique record is a 
population unique. In addition, this method retains the useful-
ness of matching against actual data without being a nonge-
neralizable, ad hoc approach using the entire data set on which 
to attempt a match.
Sources of Data for Reidentification
There are many entities, not covered by HIPAA, that collect 
and disseminate identifying information to clients and other 
users. This information is collected from a variety of sources 
and, if used in combination with information from health data 
sets, may potentially contribute to the identification of indi-
viduals. To our knowledge, there have not been demonstrated 
reidentification attacks using these sources. Such sources 
of data and information include social networking websites, 
transactional data, voter registration records, state agencies, 
and web crawlers, among others.
• Social networking sites collect a plethora of iden-
tifying information including data on the habits 
and behaviors of consumers, for instance, websites 
such as patientslikeme.com, healthboards.com, and 
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WebMD.com. There are many examples of this 
information already being used in a commercial 
manner—for example, in targeted online advertise-
ment. However, it is worth noting that this is not 
evidence that the data are used for reidentification 
purposes.
• Transaction data, such as collected by credit card 
companies or credit-reporting companies (e.g., 
Equifax, TransUnion, and Experian), hold enor-
mous amounts of sensitive financial transactional 
data that could potentially be recombined with pub-
licly released data to reidentify consumers and sold 
for behavior prediction and targeted marketing.
• Public information, such as voter registration, court 
cases, and many other government transactions, is 
publicly available and aggregated by private com-
panies. Examples include Intelius, NextMark, and 
Infogroup (previously InfoUSA).
• Health care data are also becoming increasingly 
available. For instance, states such as Vermont and 
Texas have de-identified administrative data on hos-
pital discharges available either free (Vermont) or 
for a fee (Texas). Similarly, the Pennsylvania Health 
Care Cost Containment Council provides identified 
tabular data on its website for free at the provider 
level (e.g., hospital, medical doctor) and microdata 
for a fee.
• Internet search engines, such as Pipl.com, are also 
proliferating. Unlike most data aggregators, these 
sites crawl the web looking for other websites and 
data miners with personal data. Interested users only 
need to provide the search engine with the most they 
know about the person they are looking for (e.g., first 
name, last name, city, state). In response, the search 
engine displays links to information available on the 
web for persons with matching characteristics.
In what follows, we present selected methods that have 
been developed either as modifications of methods originally 
intended for other purposes or specifically for data reiden-
tification. Reidentification methods expose weaknesses in 
masking methodologies and other efforts to protect individ-
ual and group privacy. We do not present an exhaustive list of 
the many available reidentification techniques, which vary 
widely in their complexity. Rather, we provide a broad over-
view of the major operating themes they represent.
Record Linkage
Initially developed as a method to synchronize files in cases 
where one may contain incorrect or inaccurate data, record 
linkage seeks to use two or more lists to classify pairs and 
form definite matches between each to string together records 
from different data sets (Malin, Sweeney, & Newton, 2003). 
For record linkage to proceed, a number of assumptions must 
be made about data within the sets in question. One such 
assumption is that there are common variables between the 
files. Matching data sets against commercially and publicly 
available data is one method by which reidentification can 
occur (Winkler, 2004a). Increasingly sophisticated reidentifi-
cation methods combined with greater availability of public 
information has resulted in increased risk of data disclosure 
(Winkler, 2004a).
Winkler (2004b) describes record linkage methods as 
using metrics to scale the ranges of variables while partially 
accounting for dependencies between them. Scheuren and 
Winkler (1997) have illustrated how economic variables can 
substantially increase the accuracy by which linkages in 
administrative lists can be made. Correlations between these 
variables allow researchers to create predictors that permit 
records from one of the files to be closer to smaller subsets 
of other records in the other file. The probability of identify-
ing individuals increases as the subset of predicted records 
decreases.
The most commonly used example in the literature is voter 
registration records, but many other data sets can be used. 
Loukides et al. (2010) illustrate how genetic research data can 
be used to reidentify patients within a health data set, even 
after suppression methods including the application of gener-
alization and the HIPAA Privacy Rule. The authors achieve 
this by linking diagnosis codes (International Classification 
of Diseases–Ninth Revision [ICD-9]) derived from electronic 
medical records with released research data in the form of 
DNA sequences.
Bacher, Brand, and Bender (2002) illustrate the potential 
to reidentify persons within data sets using a feature of com-
monly used statistical software. Specifically, these research-
ers use cluster analysis with SPSS to match survey data 
against register data in a German context. The approach cho-
sen by the researchers transforms and weighs variables and 
obtains a reidentification risk of approximately 10%.
Data Aggregation
While record and data linkage require direct relationships 
between features associated with the data sets, aggregation-
related approaches attempt to reidentify when there are no 
common attributes (Winkler, 2004b). The objective of data 
aggregation with regard to reidentification is to create an 
ordering of the data using combinations of individual attri-
butes. To do this in data sets containing numerical data, sev-
eral assumptions are necessary, including the following:
1. There are common individuals in the two data sets.
2. The structures to the data contained within the data 
sets are similar.
Reidentification is then achieved by matching records 
that have similar groups of attribute combinations; it occurs 
when public information is linked to data files, and names, 
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addresses, or other information are at risk of being released 
(Domingo-Ferrer & Torra, 2003). When it is known that 
the populations in the acquired data sets are overlapping, it 
becomes possible to use variables from one of them to iden-
tify a subset of records from the other (Reiter, 2003).
Probabilistic Inference
With the use of Markov random fields and graph partitioning 
algorithms, the ability to increase the chances of identifying 
individuals through the linking of records and data in groups 
of files has been illustrated by McCallum and Wellner (2003). 
There are a number of important differences between data 
linkage and record linkage, particularly in that data linkage 
was developed with the intent of reidentification. The aim of 
data linkage is to make reidentification possible for data com-
pletely lacking seemingly identifiable information (Malin 
et al., 2003). Furthermore, attributes of the associated data sets 
are not required to be the same, as the technique makes use of 
inferential relationships between file attributes, which is the 
process of attempting to reidentify when there are no com-
mon attributes between data sources.
Narayanan and Shmatikov (2008) develop a general class 
of algorithms to identify individuals within large, sparse data 
sets (i.e., data sets where only a fraction of the cells contain 
relevant information). These algorithms take into account 
some amount of auxiliary information provided on a target, 
and score the records within the data set according to how 
well it matches the target. From here, a matching criterion is 
applied, and a single record or set of probable records is iden-
tified as a match. Narayanan and Shmatikov also illustrate 
the algorithms’ resistance to de-identification data perturba-
tion and methods of generalization and suppression. The 
algorithms described were applied to the Netflix Prize set up 
by the movie rental company to improve their system. More 
than 100 million customer movie ratings were made publicly 
available. Despite the removal of identifying customer infor-
mation, the researchers were able to illustrate that simply 
removing identifying information is insufficient to produce 
anonymity.
In data linkage, characteristics of individual records of 
the data set are combined to estimate the uniqueness within 
a known population (Sweeney, 2000). Sweeney illustrated 
that, based on gender, ZIP code, and full date of birth, 87% 
of the U.S. population can be uniquely identified. The addi-
tion of extra information (i.e., race) adds more granularity 
and scarcity, thus increasing the likelihood that a record is 
unique. Sweeney has indicated that linkage is established 
through known attributes, and the probability of identify-
ing individuals increases with the addition of further data 
(Sweeney, 2000).
It is important to note that these attacks were not on health 
data. The question then becomes whether this kind of inference 
can be applied to health data. We did not find any evidence of 
this in the published literature.
Trail Reidentification
Trail reidentification expands on the concept of reidentifi-
cation by seeking to identify people who visited named 
locations in a network environment (Malin et al., 2003). 
Trail reidentification seeks to reconstruct a person through 
separately collecting and subsequently relating de-identified 
data on people who visited the location. The collected 
de-identified data consist of very few data fields. Recognizing 
uniquely occurring visit patterns across the de-identified and 
identified data sets provides the basis for trail reidentifica-
tion. These observations are made explicit by constructing a 
matrix of shared de-identified data and a matrix of shared 
identified data. The relationship to health information data 
sets exists in the ability to use this trail reidentification infor-
mation, separately or in combination, to locate individuals 
and associated sensitive health information (Malin et al., 
2003). Information gained by way of trail reidentification 
may be leveraged with health data set information to further 
uncover health or chronic disease conditions.
Standards for Acceptance of  
a File as Safe in Health Care Data Sets
There are two elements to the HIPAA Safe Harbor method 
of de-identification: (a) 18 specific identifiers and (b) actual 
knowledge. The Safe Harbor method has two parts. Part I 
dictates the removal or coarsening of 18 direct, or almost 
direct, identifiers that may be present in any data set. These 
identifiers fall into four categories: names, dates, contact infor-
mation, and record IDs. Part II of the Safe Harbor method 
requires the covered entity to ensure that it possesses no 
actual knowledge of an individual being at risk of disclosure 
after removal of the 18 identifiers.
The critical part of the aforementioned standard is its 
incorporation of a reasonable person standard. While not a 
defined legal term of art, this language likely indicates a 
significant safeguard for those who de-identify data. From 
the perspective of legal interpretation, language like “to which 
there is no reasonable basis to believe” indicates that so long as 
the covered entity was not negligent in the de-identification 
process, it is likely exempt from liability as long as it 
acts reasonably and does not believe that reidentification 
could occur.
In 2002, researchers at the Carnegie Mellon’s Data Privacy 
Lab suggested the concept of “The Minimal Risk Standard” as 
a way to operationalize Part II of the method for commercial 
purposes (Sweeney, 2010b). Two companies, Privacert Gold 
Standard and Quintiles, licensed the Data Privacy Lab’s 
risk-assessment technology to provide HIPAA certifications 
for de-identified data (Sweeney, 2010a, 2010b). According to 
the Minimal Risk Standard, the identifiability of proposed 
data should be no more than the identifiability if the pro-
posed data adhered to Safe Harbor Part I (Sweeney, 2010b). 
This, in practice, became a question of measuring the risk of 
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reidentification of a data set under Safe Harbor Part I. Work 
by Sweeney (2000) based on demographic uniqueness in the 
U.S. population showed that Safe Harbor Part I provides a 
risk of reidentification of 0.04% when demographic infor-
mation released is restricted to gender, year of birth, and 
county of residence.
The online appendix of El Emam (2011) includes a sum-
mary of metrics that have been used for identity disclosure in 
actual de-identification projects, including approaches 
embedded in software such as µ-argus.
Access
The vast amount of data now collected on human beings and 
organizations as a result of cyberinfrastructure advances has 
created significant opportunities for social scientists to study 
and understand human behavior. At the same time, technolo-
gies have recently emerged, such as virtual private network 
(VPN), biometrics, and virtual computing, that permit 
microdata to be accessed in convenient ways while also 
protecting data confidentiality (Lane, Heus, & Mulcahy, 
2008). The legal framework surrounding data access has 
evolved in recent years on a parallel course. For instance, 
landmark legislation, the CIPSEA of 2002, establishes rigor-
ous confidentiality safeguards while setting provisions for 
the statistical agencies to “designate agents, by contract or 
by entering into a special agreement” for the purpose of 
performing “exclusively statistical activities, subject to the 
limitations and penalties” within the boundaries stipulated in 
the confidentiality safeguards. As Bradburn and Straf (2003) 
argue, such laws foster norms that facilitate access to mean-
ingful statistical records and protect respondent confidenti-
ality.
Access Modality Options
Given these recent changes in technology and legal guid-
ance, data producers have several data dissemination options 
from which to choose. These options vary considerably in 
disclosure risk, analytical utility of the data, and ease of 
access. And the different data access modalities may be used 
independently or in combination, depending on one’s dis-
semination objectives and intended audience.
For example, data producers may release microdata via 
PUFs that provide access to anonymized versions of data 
sets. PUFs are widely accessible through CD-ROMs or the 
Internet, and given their broad reach, statistical agencies use 
techniques like variable suppression, top and bottom coding, 
noise infusion, and geographic aggregation before releasing 
PUFs to protect the confidentiality of the respondents 
(Weinberg, Abowd, Steel, Zayatz, & Rowland, 2007). 
Although such techniques are understandably required, they 
often diminish the usefulness of the microdata (United 
Nations, 2007) and, thus, are not the optimal dissemination 
tools in terms of analytic utility. Statistical agencies also 
release synthetic microdata. Importantly, however, all the 
benefit of synthetic data depends on the validity of the models 
used to create them.
Similar to PUFs, online tabulation engines and statistical 
data cubes provide another alternative to giving researchers 
full access to raw microdata. At the request of the research-
ers, most often online, such tabulation engines generate 
customized summary tables and matrices after having gone 
through an automated disclosure review process. Online 
tabulation engines are easily accessible through the Internet 
and retain confidentiality through suppressed summary tables; 
however, they are arguably less useful than PUFs for ana-
lytical purposes.
Remote batch processing is another dissemination modal-
ity. Although researchers do not have full access to the data 
sets, they submit programs or codes remotely via the Internet 
and receive their output once it has been reviewed for disclo-
sure control by the statistical agency. The execution is gener-
ally done offline; thus, the process is not interactive. While 
most batch processing systems use filters to suppress certain 
queries and results, in the same way as PUFs, the output 
obtained from this access modality is still potentially more 
useful than that obtained through PUF data sets (Weinberg 
et al., 2007). A review of such remote batch processing 
arrangements shows, however, that while they are relatively 
secure and can be effective for smaller requests, they can be 
slow when large computation is required (United Nations, 
2007). Also, the noninteractive aspect of this access modality 
can be a hindering experience for researchers.
The general theme that emerges from the aforementioned 
dissemination modalities is that there are serious trade-offs 
that need to be examined in terms of data access solutions, 
including data utility, confidentiality, security, and ease of 
use. While PUFs, remote batch processing, and tabulation 
engines are easy to access and have incorporated security 
measures to protect confidentiality, those measures limit ana-
lytic utility. There are, however, other options available to data 
providers that allow researchers to increase the analytical 
utility of the data.
Licensing is one such example. Under this method, 
approved researchers are granted a license via a contract 
to analyze restricted-use microdata (Weinberg et al., 2007), 
and access is provided through various means, such as 
CD-ROMs or remote access (United Nations, 2007). The 
U.S. National Center for Educational Statistics (NCES), for 
example, uses this method for a large number of its confi-
dential data sets; so does the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) for access to its National Longitudinal Surveys of 
Youth (Weinberg et al., 2007).
Due in part to recent congressional legislation and OMB 
guidance on data sharing, as well as increasing concerns that 
licensing alone cannot adequately protect data confidential-
ity, since 2006 U.S. Government agencies have explored new 
ways of disseminating information. For example, rather than 
simply “pushing out” microdata through licensing contracts 
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to researchers, the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, U.S. Department of Agriculture, the National 
Science Foundation (NSF), and other data producers are 
currently “pulling in” researchers via secure remote access 
nodes to sensitive data housed in the NORC Data Enclave.
One problem is that licensing allowing researchers direct 
access to confidential microdata involves hundreds if not 
thousands of CDs with disclosive microdata being shipped 
across the United States; hence, each access node (i.e., con-
tracted researcher), arguably, is a potential confidentiality con-
cern. Although licenses legally bind researchers to maintain 
confidentiality, even a single breach can be damaging to the 
reputation and mission of the data producer. This concern is 
exacerbated by the fact that data in this model are delivered 
through mediums such as CD-ROMs that can easily change 
hands (challenging the chain of command), even without 
malicious behavior on the part of researchers. Therefore, for 
very sensitive microdata containing detailed personal identi-
fiers, allowing this mode of access could be potentially risky, 
however trustworthy the individual researchers may be.
By sharp contrast, remote and physical data enclaves (also 
known as Research Data Centers or RDCs) are secure dis-
semination mechanisms. Whereas remote access platforms 
provide convenient access via an encrypted terminal session, 
RDCs only allow on-site access. To protect confidentiality, 
remote and physical data enclaves maintain stringent physical 
and computer security guidelines, preventing any results from 
being exported from the controlled environment without going 
through a formal disclosure review process.
An obvious advantage of remote and physical data enclaves 
is that researchers often have access to the most detailed ver-
sion of the data, that is, raw microdata, devoid of suppression. 
Access to such analytically useful data through RDCs, how-
ever, comes at a price: They are very expensive to operate 
and are not convenient to all potential researchers (i.e., they 
require researchers to be physically present at the facility). 
Furthermore, the process for reviewing proposals or what 
results may be publicly released out of an RDC is very cum-
bersome and time-consuming (United Nations, 2007).
Remote access data enclaves typically use secure technol-
ogies, such as virtual computing, to allow approved research-
ers to connect to a data server that hosts the actual microdata 
and work in a remote-desktop environment. While users 
work in a familiar desktop environment, no output may leave 
the secured environment without first undergoing stringent 
statistical disclosure control. As pointed out by one of our 
reviewers, a determined intruder can find ways to overcome 
almost any obstacle. For instance, she can easily print a data-
base to screen from the remote server and then capture the 
data using optical character recognition (OCR) technology. 
This is cumbersome and prone to error, but largely automatic 
and outside the control of the enclave administrator. Even if 
screen capture technology is not available, an off-site user 
can simply record the remote desktop with a camera. This 
is called the “analogue hole” in cryptography. Whether it is 
possible to apply stringent statistical disclosure to every sin-
gle output, taking into account previously released outputs and 
future outputs is critical in this approach. This has not been 
proven in the literature.
Conclusion
Achieving data and information dissemination without harm-
ing any individual or any group is a central task of any entity 
in charge of collecting data. The balance lies in protecting the 
privacy of those in the data while minimizing data utility loss 
(Kinney et al., 2009). Although the need for such balance is 
true of every data set, it becomes more critical when the infor-
mation collected is about personal health status and personal 
health care received.
Although several scientific disciplines have different views 
about the degree to which such balance can be achieved, they 
all agree that creating a file that is totally reidentification risk 
free is an impossible task. The question is, then, how much 
risk is tolerable. Statisticians offer several methodological 
approaches to balance disclosure treatment and utility, while 
accepting some level of risk. Some computer scientists are 
skeptical, and show low tolerance to risk, arguing for limit-
ing the release of data to the public. Critics of microdata 
releases also point out that confidentiality agreements and 
data use agreements provide no formal privacy protection 
guarantees.
Research showing analytic distortions of widely used 
masking methods raises concerns about the misapplication 
of disclosure avoidance procedures. Besides embarrass-
ment to the agency, the problem could affect a whole range 
of stakeholders.
Scientists have developed a variety of definitions and 
frameworks to quantify disclosure risk and a variety of meth-
ods to limit disclosure risk. These methods range from the 
simple suppression of a field or a subset of values in a field, 
to intricate perturbation methods such as data swapping and 
imputation via synthetic methods. Although some methods 
have been shown to be better at masking specific fields in a 
data set or to provide better protection while minimizing 
utility loss, the literature does not emphasize one method over 
another. Similarly, although different software applications 
have been designed and are available, there is no discussion 
in the literature about which one is best.
Our literature review shows that scholars have devoted 
considerable attention to the development of methods to mask 
microdata in settings in which units are not followed over 
time. However, the literature is sparse on longitudinal data. 
The addition of time as a variable adds a level of complexity 
that is still an open question in the field. The same conclusion 
holds for data utility metrics. Although several metrics have 
been proposed, the literature is vague regarding which one to 
use in practice.
Similarly, scientists have developed several methods to 
assess whether disclosure techniques have achieved the desired 
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protection. These include (a) record linkage, in which unique 
combinations of variables (e.g., gender, age, zip code) are 
used to match records in two or more data sets (e.g., a medical 
record and a voter registration list) and (b) probabilistic infer-
ence, in which sophisticated algorithms, taking into account 
some amount of auxiliary information provided publicly on a 
target, are able to detect with high probability a record or set 
of records of any given individual (i.e., identify whether a 
person with certain publicly known information is in a data 
set, and learn additional information about that person from 
the data set).
Such methods operate under different assumptions and 
have been validated empirically in very specific contexts. 
A common theme in the literature is the threat imposed by 
the growing amount of auxiliary information available either 
free or at very low prices, and the possibility that the mone-
tary cost of an attack decreases with the availability of data 
and the growth in computer power. In addition, despite 
efforts to establish standards for acceptance of a data set as 
safe for public release, methods for quantifying the risk of 
reidentification are scarce in the literature.
Although there is abundant theoretical and empirical 
research, our review reveals lack of consensus on fundamental 
questions for empirical practice: how to assess disclosure risk, 
how to choose among disclosure methods, how to assess 
reidentification risk, and how to measure utility loss. As stated 
in Kinney et al. (2009), “it is not known whether the choice of 
measures is a problem with theoretical or methodological 
structure or merely disconnected special cases amenable only 
to empirical analysis” (p. 132).
Access to microdata has also received attention in the lit-
erature. Modalities vary in terms of disclosure risk, analytical 
utility, and ease of access. Several authors make interesting 
cases about the advantages and disadvantages of each method. 
But more empirical research is needed.
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